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United States v. Reese and Post-Heller Second 
Amendment Interpretation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Reese, the Tenth Circuit ruled that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(8) (2006), a statute prohibiting an individual subject to a 
domestic protection order from possessing any type of firearm, was 
constitutional.1 In coming to this conclusion, the court determined 
that § 922(g)(8) was subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning the 
government had the burden of showing it had an important 
objective that was advanced by means substantially related to the 
objective.2 The court’s rationale behind applying intermediate 
scrutiny was based on its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller3 and is supported by other 
circuits.4  
Despite intercircuit support for intermediate scrutiny and a two-
step analysis in Second Amendment cases, the method is not 
followed uniformly, and there are questions as to whether the 
approach is actually supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Heller. In a challenge to the developing intermediate scrutiny 
standard, Judge Kavanaugh on the D.C. Circuit recently wrote a 
dissenting opinion asserting that the Supreme Court rejected 
application of balancing tests in Second Amendment challenges.5 
 
 1. 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 802. 
 3. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 4. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (weighing the 
relationship between the restriction and the governmental objective); United States v. Chester, 
628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny); United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (same), cert. denied, 1315 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); 
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 
1315 S. Ct. 1674 (2011). 
 5. Heller v. District of Columbia, No. 10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558, at *21 (D.C. Cir. 
Oct. 4, 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Heller II]. 
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According to Judge Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court created a 
framework for reviewing Second Amendment questions with a 
categorical test built on text, history, and tradition.  
This Note compares the reasoning of the courts that applied 
intermediate scrutiny with the reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh’s 
dissent and concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller 
can be read to support either view. Because judicial balancing is 
commonplace in constitutional interpretation and pure 
categoricalism is rare, the Court will have to be more clear than it 
was in Heller if it wishes to establish a categorical approach to 
evaluating Second Amendment laws. Part II of this Note reviews 
developing Second Amendment jurisprudence by looking at the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Heller and how circuit courts have 
interpreted it. Part III looks at the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Reese. Part IV examines Judge Kavanaugh’s 
interpretation of Heller, which contradicts the one adopted by most 
circuits. Part V considers the battle between categoricalism and 
balancing that appears to have arisen in Second Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part VI concludes. 
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO HELLER AND ITS PROGENY 
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 
recognizes “the individual right to possess and carry weapons.”6 
Specifically, the Court held that a District of Columbia statute that 
banned handgun possession in the home and prohibited “rendering 
any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense” violated the Second Amendment.7 
Notwithstanding this holding, the Court noted that the Second 
Amendment does not establish an unlimited right: 
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis 
today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive  
 
 
 6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 7. Id. at 635. 
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places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.8 
In determining the constitutionality of statutes that restrict 
enumerated constitutional rights, the Court has historically applied 
differing levels of scrutiny.9 While the Heller court definitively held 
that rational-basis scrutiny is insufficient for assessing infringements 
of an enumerated right like the right to keep and bear arms,10 the 
Court did not specifically endorse the application of either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment 
legislation. Instead it explained that “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, 
[the statute in question] would fail constitutional muster.”11  
In his dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority for failing to 
clearly establish a level of scrutiny for future courts to apply12 and 
strongly advocated against application of strict scrutiny.13 Arguably, 
the Court’s failure to clearly establish a level of scrutiny was 
 
 8. Id. at 626–27. In a footnote, the Court explained that this list “identif[ies] these 
presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; [the] list does not purport to be 
exhaustive.” Id. at 627 n.26.  
 9. Fourth Circuit Refuses to Uphold Federal Domestic Violence Gun Ban, 79 U.S.L.W. 
1899, 1899 (2011). 
 10. Responding to Justice Breyer’s assertion that rational-basis might apply, the majority 
wrote: 
Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws, would pass rational-
basis scrutiny. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when 
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on 
irrational laws. In those cases, “rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, 
but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test 
could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a 
specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double 
jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms. 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (citations omitted). 
 11. Id. at 628–29. 
 12. Id. at 687–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 689 (“[A]doption of a true strict-scrutiny standard for evaluating gun 
regulations would be impossible. . . . [A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun 
regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected 
by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the 
other . . . .”). 
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intentional—an express rejection of all three traditional methods of 
scrutiny as “judge-empowering” and undesirable.14 This argument is 
buttressed by the Court’s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago 
where the Court clearly stated that “[i]n Heller, however, we 
expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second 
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest 
balancing.”15 
Despite the anti-balancing language in Heller and McDonald, the 
Court’s failure to identify a test to apply in cases reviewing Second 
Amendment restrictions has almost uniformly led to application of 
intermediate scrutiny.16 This fact is illustrated in the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Reese. 
III. UNITED STATES V. REESE 
A. Reese’s Knowing Violation 
In the summer of 2003, James Reese moved to Hawaii with his 
then-wife Jennifer and their three minor children.17 After the couple 
separated, Jennifer filed a petition for a restraining order in Hawaii 
state court on behalf of herself and the children.18 The petition 
alleged Reese “‘physically harmed, injured or assaulted’ [Jennifer] 
‘by pushing, grabbing, [and] shoving her’ as well as ‘breaking [her] 
finger[,]’ . . . ‘point[ing] a handgun at [her]’ and threaten[ing] to 
kill her[,]’ . . . ‘subject[ing] her to extreme psychological 
abuse[,] . . . [and] threaten[ing] to take [the] children.’”19 Jennifer 
also said that Reese “‘was an alcoholic,’ ‘ha[d] a history of domestic 
violence,’ was ‘extremely controlling,’ ‘had a bad temper,’ and ‘di[d] 
 
 14. Id. at 634 (majority opinion). 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010). In McDonald, the Court’s only definitive holding 
was that the Second Amendment applied to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but the Court’s discussion of Heller is instructive because it is the only Supreme 
Court case where Heller’s interpretation is considered. Id. 
 16. Every circuit but the 11th has expressly adopted intermediate scrutiny, although a 
few judges have advocated for strict scrutiny in dissents. See supra note 4. 
 17. United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2476 (2011). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (some alterations in the original and some alterations added by the Author) 
(quoting Aplt.App at 105–06). 
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not accept the separation.’”20 Finally, Jennifer “alleged that Reese 
owned firearms that could be used to threaten, injure or abuse 
another person.”21 Shortly after filing the petition for the restraining 
order, Jennifer filed for divorce.22 
Several months later in a family court hearing on Jennifer’s 
motion for a protective order, Reese denied Jennifer’s allegations of 
abuse “‘but nevertheless ‘agreed to [the imposition] of a restraining 
order. . . .”23 Accordingly, the court issued the protective order 
against Reese. In pertinent part, the order prohibited Reese from 
“(a) threatening or physically abusing Jennifer or their minor 
children, (b) contacting Jennifer or their minor children, and ‘(c) 
possessing, controlling, or transferring ownership of any firearm, 
ammunition, firearm permit or license’” while the order endured.24 
The order specifically indicated that it did not expire until the court 
so ordered and stated that its terms and conditions were explained to 
and understood by the parties.25 Shortly thereafter, the couple 
divorced.26 
Reese later remarried and relocated to New Mexico.27 In the 
summer of 2009, police were involved in a domestic dispute 
involving Reese and his wife.28 According to Reese’s wife, Danielle, 
she and Reese started arguing while they were driving and eventually 
pulled over to the side of the road to fight.29 Danielle alleged Reese 
was physically violent and said she was afraid he might hurt her or 
the children.30 During the investigation, Danielle told police there 
were guns located throughout their home, and that she had 
 
 20. Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting Aplt.App. at 106). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 795 (alterations in the original) (quoting Aplt.App. at 109).  
 24. Id. (quoting Aplt.App. at 112). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 796. 
 30. Id. 
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purchased guns for Reese.31 The home contained more than twenty 
firearms.32 After formally arresting him, an officer asked Reese if he 
was “aware of a [protective] order that prohibit[ed] [him] from 
having firearms.”33 Reese replied that he was not aware of any 
protective order.34 While escorting Reese to the patrol car, the officer 
again asked Reese if he was “aware of a [protective] order out of 
Hawaii.”35 This time Reese responded by asking the officer “Where 
did you get that?”36 The officer then asked Reese if “[he] want[ed]  
to read the protective order.”37 Reese responded, “No. I know what 
it says.”38 
Reese was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts of 
possessing a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(8).39 Given Reese’s 
situation, i.e., a former spouse subject to a domestic protection 
order, he was exactly the kind of person the statute prevented from 
possessing firearms. In fact, it is likely that stories like his inspired the 
prohibitions enacted by the legislature. Nevertheless, Reese claimed 
“§ 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him,” 
and moved to dismiss the indictment.40 The district court granted 
Reese’s motion, finding the statute constitutional on its face, but 
unconstitutional as applied to Reese.41 In so holding, the court 
reasoned the order was “not ‘narrowly tailored to serve the 
governmental interest of reducing domestic violence.’”42  
 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 797. In addition to the guns at the residence, police eventually seized around 
thirty-three firearms from Reese’s place of business. Id. at 798. 
 33. Id. at 796 (alterations in the original) (quoting Aplt.App. at 40). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 796–97 (alteration in the original) (quoting Aplt.App. at 41).(internal 
quotation marks and original brackets omitted). 
 36. Id. at 797 (alteration in the original) (quoting Aplt.App. at 41). 
 37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aplt.App. at 41). 
 38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aplt.App at 41). 
 39. Id. at 798. 
 40. Id. at 798. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 799 (quoting the district court). 
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B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision 
 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the 
motion to dismiss.43 Evaluating the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8) 
as applied to Reese, the court acknowledged Heller as the controlling 
precedent for Second Amendment cases, but noted that “[t]he 
Supreme Court did not specify in Heller precisely what level of 
scrutiny a reviewing court must apply to a challenged law.”44 
Accordingly, the court expressly “look[ed] to analogous cases for 
guidance on precisely what level to apply.”45 Thus, the court 
discussed the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Marzzarella 
and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Skoien.46 
United States v. Marzzarella concerned 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) 
(2006), a prohibition on possession of firearms with obliterated serial 
numbers.47 In its decision, the Marzzarella court reasoned that 
“[w]hether or not strict scrutiny may apply to particular Second 
Amendment challenges, it is not the case that it must be applied to 
all Second Amendment challenges.”48 According to the Marzzarella 
court, “[s]trict scrutiny does not apply automatically any time an 
enumerated right is involved.”49 The court supported this assertion 
by pointing out that “[w]e do not treat First Amendment challenges 
that way,” and by discussing First Amendment treatment of laws 
regulating speech.50 Thus, as the Reese court later summarized, the 
“Third Circuit concluded that, ‘the Second Amendment can trigger 
 
 43. Id. at 805. In reversing the lower court, the Tenth Circuit noted errors in the 
district court’s decision that this Note does not address in order to focus on the court’s Second 
Amendment analysis. E.g., “[T]he court erred in focusing on the underlying protective order 
issued by the Hawaii Family Court instead of the challenged federal statute.” Id. 
 44. Id. at 801. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 801–02. 
 47. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 1315 S. 
Ct. 958 (2011). 
 48. Id. at 96, quoted in Reese, 627 F.3d at 801. 
 49. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96. 
 50. Id. 
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more than one particular standard of scrutiny,’ depending, at least in 
part, upon ‘the type of law challenged and the type of [Second 
Amendment restriction] at issue.’”51 Continuing the analogy to First 
Amendment cases, “the Third Circuit framed the intermediate 
scrutiny inquiry in this way: whether the challenged law served a 
‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important’ governmental interest, and, 
if so, whether the ‘fit between the challenged [law] and the asserted 
objective [wa]s reasonable, not perfect.’”52 
The Tenth Circuit also examined the reasoning in United States 
v. Skoien, a Seventh Circuit case concerning 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 
a statute prohibiting possession of firearms by any person who “has 
been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.”53 In upholding the statute, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that Heller did not require firearms regulations to 
“mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.”54 Rather, the court 
concluded that “some categorical disqualifications are permissible: 
Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who 
have been shown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these 
limits be established by evidence presented in court.”55 Like the 
Marzzarella court, the Skoien court buttressed its reasoning by citing 
cases concerning analogous constitutional rights and found that the 
prohibition was subject to intermediate scrutiny.56 In the words of 
the Reese court, “the Seventh Circuit . . . framed the inquiry in this 
way: whether the statute was ‘substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.’”57 
In considering Reese’s challenge to § 922(g)(8), the Tenth 
Circuit determined that the statute compared favorably to the 
statutes challenged in Marzzarella and Skoien.58 
 
 51. Reese, 627 F.3d at 801 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97) (alterations in 
original). 
 52. Id. at 801 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98) (alterations in original). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). 
 54. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1674 (2011). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Reese, 627 F.3d at 802 (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641). 
 58. Id. at 802. 
BARLOW.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 11:23 AM 
391 Post-Heller Second Amendment 
 
 
 399 
 
 
First, the court asked whether § 922(g)(8) imposed a burden on 
Reese’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.59 
Concluding that it obviously did, the court decided to review the 
infringement based on an intermediate scrutiny test. The court 
reasoned as follows: 
To pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, the 
government has the burden of demonstrating that its objective is 
an important one and that its objective is advanced by means 
substantially related to that objective. Here, the government asserts 
that the objective of § 922(g)(8) is to keep firearms out of the 
hands of people who have been judicially determined to pose a 
credible threat to the physical safety of a family member, or who 
have been ordered not to use, attempt to use, or threaten to use 
physical force against an intimate partner or child that would 
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury, because [s]uch 
persons undeniably pose a heightened danger of misusing 
firearms.60 
After determining that the government’s objective in § 
922(g)(8)—restricting firearms possession by individuals likely to 
commit violent crimes—was important, the court held that 
application of § 922(g)(8) to Reese was appropriate given that the 
 
 59. Id. at 800. 
 60. Id. at 802 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also 
referred to the following Skoien court findings in support of the government’s objective: 
That firearms cause injury or death in domestic situations also has been established. 
Domestic assaults with firearms are approximately twelve times more likely to end in 
the victim’s death than are assaults by knives or fists. Part of this effect stems from 
the fact that some would-be abusers go buy a gun and much from the fact that guns 
are more lethal than knives and clubs once an attack begins. The presence of a gun 
in the home of a convicted domestic abuser is “strongly and independently 
associated with an increased risk of homicide.” And for this purpose the victims 
include police as well as spouses, children, and intimate partners. Responding to a 
domestic-disturbance call is among an officer’s most risky duties. Approximately 8% 
of officers’ fatalities from illegal conduct during 1999 through 2008 arose from 
attempts to control domestic disturbances. Finally, the recidivism rate is high, 
implying that there are substantial benefits in keeping the most deadly weapons out 
of the hands of domestic abusers. 
Id. at 802–03 (citations omitted) (quoting Arther L. Kellerman et al., Gun Ownership as Risk 
Factor for Homicide in the Home, 329 New England J. Medicine 1084, 1087 (1993)). 
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protective order against Reese from the Hawaii state court clearly 
satisfies the requirements in § 922(g)(8).61 
In sum, the Tenth Circuit, relying heavily on reasoning from the 
Third and Seventh Circuits, determined that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Heller supported application of intermediate scrutiny in 
Second Amendment challenges and, in applying such a test, 
determined that Reese was correctly indicted under § 922(g)(8) for 
firearms possession. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
Despite the circuit courts’ reliance on intermediate scrutiny and 
constitutional balancing, there is reason to doubt whether Heller 
should be read to authorize this standard of review. One scholar has 
argued that “[f]rom its central holding, which extends broad 
protection to the ‘individual’ right to bear arms unconnected from 
militia service, to its flat exclusions of felons, the mentally ill, and 
certain ‘Arms’ from constitutional coverage, the majority opinion in 
Heller was categorical in its approach.”62 In fact, the Heller majority 
appeared to flatly reject balancing tests: 
The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee 
that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, 
libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of 
extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second 
Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of 
an interest balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer 
[advocating intermediate scrutiny in his dissent] would now 
conduct for them anew.63 
 
 
 61. Id. at 804. By its terms, § 922(g)(8) prohibits someone subject to a court order that 
(a) was issued after a hearing of which the person was aware and at which the person was 
allowed to participate, (b) proscribes the person from harassing, intimidating, or stalking “an 
intimate partner . . . or child,” and (c) either includes a credible finding that the person is a 
threat to the safety of the intimate partner or child or “by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child” from 
possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(8) (2006). 
 62. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 405 (2009). 
 63. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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However, the majority’s decision to avoid balancing tests has 
been either ignored or, more likely, unrecognized. Courts have 
interpreted Heller differently, including assertions that the Heller 
majority “consciously left the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
another day,”64 “did not specify . . . precisely what level of scrutiny a 
reviewing court must apply to a challenged law,”65 or definitively 
concluded “that some form of heightened judicial scrutiny is 
required; rational-basis review has been ruled out.”66 The inability to 
recognize the Heller Court’s categorical language is likely born from 
the familiarity and comfort derived from reverting to the tiers of 
scrutiny often used in constitutional interpretation. However, “the 
search for the familiar may be leading courts and commentators 
astray.”67 
To date, only one opinion has identified the Heller majority’s 
preference for categoricalism. Even then, the identification came in a 
dissenting opinion that was overruled by a majority that preferred 
intermediate scrutiny balancing. 
In his Heller II dissent, Judge Kavanaugh suggested that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald established a 
precedent whereby “courts are to assess gun bans and regulations 
based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as 
strict or intermediate scrutiny.”68 He noted “the Supreme Court in 
Heller never asked whether the law was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest (strict scrutiny) or substantially 
related to an important government interest (intermediate scrutiny). 
If the Supreme Court had meant to adopt one of those tests, it could 
have said so.”69 Instead, “the test the Court relied on—as it 
indicated by using terms such as ‘historical tradition’ and 
 
 64. United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008). 
 65. Reese, 627 F.3d at 801. 
 66. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 651 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1674 (2011). 
 67. Blocher, supra note 62, at 379. 
 68. Heller II, No. 10–7036, 2011 WL 4551558, at *23 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at *24. 
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‘longstanding’ and ‘historical justifications’—was one of text, history, 
and tradition.”70 Kavanaugh points out that, in his Heller dissent, 
Justice Breyer advocated intermediate scrutiny review of the D.C. 
gun law, discussing the government’s interests and the fit between 
the D.C statute and those interests, but the majority rejected a 
“judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry’ that ‘asks whether 
the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that 
is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other 
important governmental interests.’”71 Judge Kavanaugh explained 
that the discord between the majority and dissent in Heller “was 
resolved in favor of categoricalism—with the categories defined by 
text, history, and tradition—and against balancing tests such as strict 
or intermediate scrutiny or reasonableness.”72 
V. BALANCING VS. CATEGORICALISM 
The difference between the Reese court’s application of a 
balancing test and Judge Kavanaugh’s advocacy of categoricalism is a 
matter of interpretation—not only interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald, but also constitutional 
interpretation. Categoricalism and balancing “roughly track[] the 
familiar division between rules and standards: ‘Categorization 
corresponds to rules, balancing to standards.’”73 The war between 
balancing and categorization has involved many battles throughout 
the history of American jurisprudence.74 The issue strikes at the heart 
of judicial philosophy, pitting strong legal minds against one 
another. As one scholar put it: 
The Justices of rules are skeptical about reasoned elaboration and 
suspect that standards will enable the Court to translate raw 
subjective value preferences into law. The Justices of standards are 
skeptical about the capacity of rules to constrain value choice and 
 
 70. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 635 (2008)). 
 71. Id. at *27 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Id. at *32. 
 73. Blocher, supra note 62, at 381–82 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 58 
(1992)). 
 74. For a look at the historical conflicts between categoricalism and balancing, see 
Blocher, supra note 62. 
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believe that custom and shared understandings can adequately 
constrain judicial deliberation in a regime of standards.75 
Perhaps epitomizing the Justices of rules, Robert Bork wrote: 
“Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas 
by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed 
beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.”76 Under this 
view, the judiciary’s societal role is to make decisions based on the 
principles of the Constitution. Departure from principles-based 
judging, while sometimes convenient, opens the door to subjecting 
society to the values of individual judges. Justices of rules would 
argue that adherence to this method ensures the judiciary is limited 
to exercising the power expressly bestowed upon it by the people 
through the Constitution. If the government is to serve the people, 
it cannot be a source of power unto itself. According to Justice 
Scalia, adherence to rules is “the course of judicial restraint, ‘making’ 
as little law as possible in order to decide the case at hand.”77 
Refraining from “making” law allows for greater predictability, “a 
needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name.”78 Justices of 
rules prefer the uniformity that comes with a categorical approach to 
adjudication. 
Perhaps typifying the Justices of standards, Justice Souter has 
argued that “[t]he Constitution has a good share of deliberately 
open-ended guarantees” that “call for more elaborate reasoning to 
show why very general language applies in some specific cases but 
not in others, and over time the various examples turn into rules that 
the Constitution does not mention.”79 Because the Constitution 
contains competing values, the Court often faces tough cases where 
 
 75. Sullivan, supra note 73, at 27. 
 76. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 3 (1971). 
 77. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1989). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice David Souter’s Speech, HARVARD GAZETTE, 
May 27, 2010, available at http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-
justice-david-souters-speech/. 
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“[t]he court has to decide which of our approved desires has the 
better claim, right here, right now, and the court has to do more 
than read fairly when it makes this kind of choice.”80 The facts of a 
given case often require the courts to weigh societal values against 
one another. In these cases, literal applications of the constitutional 
text have “only a tenuous connection to reality.”81 Justice 
Frankfurter, the “chief spokesman”82 for balancing, has also 
contended that “[a]bsolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute 
exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules.” 
83 Accordingly, constitutional guarantees are “better served by 
candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the 
confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too 
inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved.”84 
The battle between rules and standards (along with the parallel 
conflict between categoricalism and balancing) will likely never be 
resolved. While we want our law to be objective, consistent, and to 
conform to cultural traditions (favoring rules), we also “expect the 
law to be flexible enough to adapt to a changing society, so that it 
may reflect contemporary notions of justice”85 (favoring standards). 
Depending on the specific fact scenario in question or the ruling 
judge’s ideology, a court will rule in favor of one conflicting policy 
or the other. Another court, favoring the opposing policy or 
employing a conflicting ideology, will rule differently. Thus begins a 
judicial chasm that often subsists for generations, even after the 
Supreme Court has adopted one side’s viewpoint. Because the 
controversy over the interpretation of the Second Amendment 
reflects societal values that seem to conflict—the natural desire for 
personal protection from oppression and crime versus the aspiration 
for safe, peaceful neighborhoods—it is likely that the battle between 
rules and standards will subsist as Second Amendment jurisprudence 
develops. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1424 
(1961). 
 83. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 525.  
 85. WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 16 (2d. ed. 2008). 
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VI. SO WHAT’S THE DECISION AND WHO’S MAKING IT? 
As it currently stands, litigators and scholars—along with 
individuals whose rights are directly affected by regulations related to 
the Second Amendment—have been left without a clear 
understanding of Second Amendment law. On the one hand, it is 
clear the sister circuits have decided to apply intermediate scrutiny 
review, a balancing test, in Second Amendment cases. The First, 
Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have all applied 
intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges since the 
Heller decision in 2008.86 On the other hand, support for 
intermediate scrutiny is hard to find in the text of Heller. Other than 
stating that the statute under review in Heller would have been 
invalid “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied 
to enumerated constitutional rights”87 and a footnote explaining why 
rational basis review was inappropriate,88 the Court did not use any 
balancing language at all, let alone call for a balancing test. In fact, as 
Judge Kavanaugh pointed out, the Court overtly opposed 
balancing.89 In other words, sister circuits may be settling on a 
method that runs counter to Supreme Court precedent. 
 
 
 86. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (weighing the 
relationship between the firearm restriction and the governmental objective); Heller II, No. 
10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (same); United States v. Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); United States 
v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011) (en 
banc) (same); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 
2476 (2011) (same). Also, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that there is “no reason to 
exclude” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the statutory prohibition against the possession of firearms by 
persons convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, “from the list of 
longstanding prohibitions on which Heller does not cast doubt.” United States v. White, 593 
F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010). In Chester, the Fourth Circuit rejected this approach as 
too deferential, saying it “approximates rational-basis review, which has been rejected by 
Heller.” Chester, 628 F.3d at 679, quoted in Criminal Law—Firearms: Fourth Circuit Refuses 
to Uphold Federal Domestic Violence Gun Ban, 79 U.S.L.W. 1899 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 87. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 88. Id. at 628 n.27. 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
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But the fact that Heller does not specifically endorse intermediate 
scrutiny balancing is not necessarily an endorsement for a purely 
categorical approach. In fact, one could argue that it would be 
unreasonable to assume the Heller Court created a purely categorical 
approach since most instances of categoricalism in our jurisprudence 
ultimately devolve into some form of balancing anyway.90  
A categorical approach is a plausible standard for Second 
Amendment interpretation, and as Judge Kavanaugh argued, there is 
evidence that the Court favored such an approach. However, in 
order to overcome the judicial inclination towards balancing tests, 
the Supreme Court needs to use stronger, clearer language than 
what is found in Heller and McDonald and explicitly adopt and 
articulate a categorical test that can be applied by lower courts. 
As it stands, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in 
Marzzarella, Skoien, and Reese. While denial of certiorari does not 
necessarily mean the Court approves of the reasoning in those 
cases,91 it does mean the holdings remain precedent in their 
respective circuits. Unless the Court steps in and clarifies that Heller 
called for a more categorical approach, the circuits’ near-uniform 
selection of intermediate scrutiny balancing will become the 
overarching rule for the Second Amendment. 
E. Garret Barlow* 
 
 
 
 
 90. For example, while First Amendment law employs substantial categorization, even 
categories like content discrimination can potentially be justified under strict scrutiny 
balancing. 
 91. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (“It is, 
of course, sufficiently evident that the refusal of an application for [writ of certiorari] is in no 
case equivalent to an affirmance of the decree that is sought to be reviewed.”) 
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